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This comment is limited to the ‘public body’ issue and the question of
so-called ‘double remedies’. It ends with a few tentative explanations as to why
the Appellate Body in this dispute opted for a rather restrictive interpretation or,
depending on one’s viewpoint, activist approach as compared to the Panel in the
same case.
1. Public body
On ‘public body’, Prusa and Vermulst write that the Appellate Body’s (AB)
‘conclusions and analysis were correct’ (see abstract), unfortunately, without
further explanation. Unless tweaked in future reﬁnements, the AB’s test of
‘governmental authority/function’ is highly questionable as a matter of law, and
unlikely to work as a matter of practice.
The applicable SCM provision refers to ‘a ﬁnancial contribution by a
government or any public body within the territory of a Member’ (underlining
added). By deﬁning ‘public body’ as limited to entities that are exercising
‘governmental authority’, the AB has essentially read out of the SCM Agreement
the words ‘or any public body’. If the drafters only wanted to cover what is usually
understood as ‘government’, they would not have added these words. When the AB
refers to the Articles on State Responsibility of the International Law Commission
(ILC) on the subject of when (wrongful) conduct can be ‘attributed’ to a ‘state’, the
ILC deﬁnes what is meant by ‘government’ or ‘state’. Yet, the SCM Agreement
went beyond this and expanded coverage to include not only ‘government’ but also
‘any public body’. The ILC Articles say nothing on the meaning of ‘public bodies’,
* For the beneﬁt of full disclosure, the author has been involved in this dispute on the side of certain US
companies who originally petitioned US authorities to impose AD and CVD duties against selected imports
from China. The opinions expressed in this comment are, however, strictly personal and cannot be
attributed to anyone else but the author himself.
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a term that does not even appear in those Articles. The AB relies ultimately on ILC
Article 5. Yet, the reasoning is circular: The only thing that Article 5 says is that
‘conduct of a person or entity . . . which is empowered by the law of that State to
exercise elements of the governmental authority’ shall be considered ‘an act of the
State’. So all that Article 5 says is the obvious and was not contested, namely that
entities ‘exercising elements of governmental authority’ are, indeed, part of the
‘government’. It says nothing on what a ‘public body’ is, let alone does it limit the
deﬁnition of ‘public body’ to the entities covered under Article 5. Again, Article 5
and the entire ILC Articles do not even mention the words ‘public body’.
A better approach would have been (i) to consider the SCM Agreement as lex
specialis (after all, SCM Article 1 sets out primary rules on what is a subsidy − ILC
Articles 4–8 elaborate on secondary rules in respect of attribution of wrongful
conduct); (ii) to examine the ordinary/dictionary meaning of ‘public body’ which,
the AB conceded, includes bodies controlled by the state; and (iii) to then assess
whether anything in the surrounding context of the SCM Agreement should lead
the AB to exclude from this ‘ordinary meaning’ entities controlled by the
government. No such excluding language exists: not in the SCM Agreement or
anywhere else in the WTO treaty or in the ILC Articles. If anything, when it comes
to China, China’s Working Party Report conﬁrmed that state-owned enterprises
are ‘government actors’ for purposes of SCM Article 1.1(a).1
Instead, we are now left with what could turn out to be a very unclear and
subjective test of ‘governmental authority/function’: When does an entity have
governmental authority? What is a governmental function? How can any of this
be proven? Will governments not ﬁnd ways to hide delegation of power or
instructions, especially if they control the board of a company anyhow? An
informal phone call or discussion should sufﬁce, without leaving any trace, so how
is a competitor supposed to ﬁnd evidence of this − as the Panel in this dispute put
it, this would amount to ﬁnding ‘evidence that the government directed itself’.
The test of ‘control’ by the government (e.g. through ownership or the right to
appoint directors), that is, the test upheld by the Panel in this dispute (and previous
Panels before it) is a more objective test and more workable, even though it does
remain a proxy. After all, at this stage (‘ﬁnancial contribution by a government or
any public body’), the question is only about who gives the ﬁnancial contribution,
what is the nature of the body or entity providing the loan or goods, not why the
loan or goods are provided (e.g. for this or that governmental or other purpose).
1 Paragraph 172 of China’s Working Party Report, conﬁrmed as a binding part of China’s accession
through China’s Accession Protocol, provides: ‘Some members of the Working Party, in view of the special
characteristics of China’s economy, sought to clarify that when state-owned enterprises (including banks)
provided ﬁnancial contributions, they were doing so as government actors within the scope of Article 1.1(a)
of the SCM Agreement. The representative of China noted, however, that such ﬁnancial contributions
would not necessarily give rise to a beneﬁt . . . The Working Party took note of this commitment’
(underlining added).
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The question of what is done or why, comes up only later, under ‘beneﬁt’. For
example, a loan is provided by the government or a public body, which in itself is
not a problem or wrongful. It becomes a problem or ‘subsidy’ only if the loan is
provided below market terms, that is, so as to ‘beneﬁt’ the one receiving the loan
and is speciﬁc. This noncommercial nature of the loan is then seen as a proxy for
the loan being awarded for noncommercial purposes, if you wish, in pursuit of one
or the other ‘governmental function’. As Cartland et al. put it: ‘the question of
whether a particular entity can be considered a public body . . . has simply to do
with whether the entity can be used as a conduit for providing a subsidy . . . being
vested with or exercising [governmental] authority is unnecessary for an entity to
be a conduit for subsidies.2
The best way out of this conundrum may already be indicated by the AB itself,
when it found that proof of ‘meaningful control’ by the government can be
sufﬁcient evidence of exercise of governmental authority.3 Ultimately, the AB
already found that Chinese state-owned commercial banks are ‘public bodies’, even
under its newly announced test of ‘governmental authority/function’, and this on
relatively little, additional evidence of these banks operating under the inﬂuence of,
and in pursuit of, governmental objectives. If further tweaked in this direction, the
test may be clariﬁed and become more workable, by essentially moving back to
evidence of ‘meaningful control’ by the government (not just majority ownership)
which can then work as a proxy of governmental authority/function (unless
rebutted by the government in question who will, in most cases, be the only party in
possession of the relevant evidence anyhow).
2. Double remedies
In respect of ‘double remedies’, Prusa and Vermulst offer an insightful analysis
of the economics of cumulative application of countervailing (CVD) and anti-
dumping (AD) duties. They show that in many, if not most, scenarios (export
subsidies, domestic subsidies in nonmarket economies as well as domestic subsidies
in market economies) some overlap or ‘double remedy’ is possible, depending on a
number of factors, in particular, the degree of pass-through of the subsidy on
domestic prices, export prices, and/or surrogate values in a third country. Overlap
is, in other words, a matter of degree and calculation. However, what they overlook
is that the drafters of the WTO treaty were aware of this and to simplify matters set
up a number of ‘legal ﬁctions’. In GATT Article VI:5, they did outlaw cumulative
application of CVD and AD duties in respect of export subsidies, based on the
2M. Cartland, G. Depayre, and J. Woznowski (2012), ‘Is Something Going Wrong in the WTO
Dispute Settlement?’, 46:5 Journal of World Trade, 979, at 1000 and 1001.
3 AB Report, para. 318: ‘evidence that a government exercises meaningful control over an entity and its
conduct may serve, in certain circumstances, as evidence that the relevant entity possesses governmental
authority and exercises such authority in the performance of governmental functions’.
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simplifying assumptions or ‘legal ﬁction’ that an export subsidy will have no impact
on domestic prices and fully pass through into lower export prices.4 The drafters of
GATT (in 1947) and later the SCM Agreement (in 1994) and, later still, China’s
Accession Protocol (in 2001) did not impose a similar prohibition in respect of
other (domestic) subsidies. They could have done so, and based on GATT Article
VI:5 knew how to do this, but did not do so. Instead, for domestic subsidies they
‘assumed’ something different and, to simplify complex economic effects, worked
on the basis of another ‘legal ﬁction’, namely that domestic subsidies pass through
to the same extent into both domestic and export prices so that a prohibition
on cumulation is not warranted. For domestic subsidies in a nonmarket economy
(NME), such as (in US eyes) China, where surrogate values in a third country may
be used, this ‘legal ﬁction’may be more tenuous than in a market-economy scenario
(although, as Prusa and Vermulst admit, also surrogate values may be affected by
subsidies). Yet the drafters maintained the ﬁction also for nonmarket economies.
Indeed, in Rule 15 of China’s Protocol of Accession they elaborated in quite some
detail how AD and CVD can be imposed against Chinese imports without, at any
stage, even hinting at the fact that, when it comes to China as an NME, a choice
must be made between either AD or CVD.
Many of these ‘legal ﬁctions’ may be inaccurate from an economic perspective
as they may not capture the exact economic effects in all scenarios. Yet, for
negotiators, lawyers, and investigators, these ‘legal ﬁctions’ were considered
necessary to simplify matters. That these ‘ﬁctions’, and the legal rules that are built
on them, make limited economic sense is no reason to change the rules or to make a
ﬁnding of violation. Yet, that is exactly what Prusa and Vermulst call for. That
‘the economic rationale for banning simultaneous AD and CVD for export
subsidies applies equally well (or perhaps even better) to domestic subsidies when
the NME method is used to compute normal value’ may well be correct. Yet, this is
no excuse for the AB, as an adjudicator (not a legislator), to change the explicit text
of the one rule where cumulation is prohibited, that is, to amend GATT Art. VI:5
for it to outlaw not only cumulation in respect of export subsidies but also in
respect of (some) domestic subsidies. Many WTO rules do not make full economic
sense. Applying the same logic, GATT Art. XI:1, which only prohibits quantitative
export restrictions (not export taxes), would then also need to be ‘judicially revised’
as, in economic terms, one can achieve the same effect with a (permitted) export tax
as the effect stemming from a (prohibited) export quota. There as well, in Prusa
and Vermulst’s words, ‘the economic rationale for banning [quantitative export
restrictions] applies equally well to [export taxes]’.
4 GATT Article VI:5 reads as follows: ‘No product of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to both anti-dumping and countervailing
duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping or export subsidization.’
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Prusa and Vermulst use the analogous economic rationale for export subsidies
and the cumulation of CVD and AD duties in an NME scenario to conclude that, in
the latter scenario as well, the AB should simply have prohibited any cumulation
(as GATT Art. VI:5 does in respect of export subsidies) rather than calling upon
US investigating authorities to measure the actual extent of overlap and to
then limit CVD duties accordingly. Since ‘measurement [of double remedies] is
extremely messy and complicated’, Prusa and Vermulst suggest to impose the same
simplifying ‘legal ﬁction’ as the ﬁction imposed for export subsidies in GATT
Art. VI:5 and to outrightly prohibit any cumulation of CVD and AD duties in an
NME scenario. Measuring the exact degree of cumulation will, indeed, be messy.
However, WTO drafters realized this and, as pointed out earlier, did opt for a num-
ber of simplifying ‘legal ﬁctions’: for export subsidies they prohibited cumulation;
for other subsidies they did not. Prusa and Vermulst may be correct that one better
turns to a ‘legal ﬁction’ instead of opening Pandora’s box of trying to measure the
exact degree of pass-through and resulting overlap. However, the legal ﬁction they
then turn to is not the one currently written in the WTO rule book, but the legal
ﬁction they would opt for if they had to redraft the WTO treaty. This is not the role
of an adjudicator, but the task normally bestowed on treaty negotiators.
Prusa and Vermulst do not even address the ultimate legal hook on which the
AB hung its prohibition on double remedies in the NME scenario, namely SCM
Article 19:3. It seems beyond doubt that the drafters of this provision did not even
think of this scenario, let alone the prohibition that the AB read into Article 19:3.5
Article 19:3, in relevant parts, simply reads that ‘when a countervailing duty is
imposed . . . such countervailing duty shall be levied, in the appropriate amounts in
each case, on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of such products from all
sources found to be subsidized’. By its very terms, this provision addresses not the
calculation of a subsidy or a CVD duty, nor the imposition of a CVD, but only the
subsequent and technical step of actually ‘levying’ the CVD duty set in earlier steps.
Moreover, it has nothing to do with adjusting the CVD duty in view of certain
circumstances (e.g. cumulation with an AD duty) but only with ensuring that
the correct or ‘appropriate’ CVD duty is imposed on the relevant product, on a
‘non-discriminatory basis’ (e.g. if one Chinese producer got subsidies of 10 per unit,
and another subsidies of only 5, the CVD levied on imports of the ﬁrst should,
appropriately, be 10 and those of the second 5). Finally, Article 19:3 explicitly lists
those scenarios where a CVD can no longer be imposed (renunciation of the
subsidy or where an undertaking has been accepted), and this list does not include
nor even remotely refer to the question of AD or cumulation.
5 Cartland et al., supra note 2, at 995 (‘The effect of the AB’s analysis . . . is to render the lesser-duty rule
essentially mandatory in the context of simultaneous application of AD and CVD to non-market
economies . . . One does not to be a researcher in the history of the negotiations of Article 19 . . . to know
that such a linkage between the amount of a subsidy and injury has never been agreed.’).
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3. Treaty interpretation or activism?
In conclusion, both in respect of ‘public body’ and ‘double remedies’, the AB has
opted for an approach that limits the scope for investigating authorities to impose
countervailing duties: a ﬁnancial contribution can only amount to a ‘subsidy’ when
provided by an entity exercising governmental authority; the amount of a CVD, in
the NME scenario where also AD duties are imposed, must be adjusted and limited
to avoid ‘double remedies’. It is notoriously difﬁcult to decide whether this is an
instance of AB activism (reading ‘any public body’ out of the SCM Agreement and
reading a prohibition on cumulation into Art. 19:3 where the drafters provided
none) or whether this is merely an instance where the AB interpreted the WTO
treaty restrictively following the steps of treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. This is a matter that, more often than not, lies
in the eye of the beholder.
What can, in any event, be said is that compared to the Panel in this case (who
interpreted public body as including entities controlled by the government, and did
not see a prohibition on cumulative application of AD and CVD duties other than in
the scenario of export subsidies), the AB has taken a considerably more restrictive
approach. What could possibly explain this rather drastic move, and dramatic
reversal of the Panel Report? Is this proof of the AB slowly removing itself from a
predominantly textual approach to treaty interpretation? Did the AB decide these
matters as questions of ﬁrst impression, inspired by elements of common sense, gen-
eral principles, or analogies more than the actual rules agreed upon? In the face of
deadlock in the Doha Round of negotiations for more than ten years now, is the AB
hereby more willing to update the rules itself to newly emerging circumstances, even
though the original drafters most probably never thought of these new scenarios?
One puzzling element, in this respect, is the AB’s almost complete neglect of
China’s Accession Protocol (in particular Rule 15 on AD and CVD) as well as
China’s Working Party Report (quoted earlier). These documents postdate the
conclusion of the WTO treaty and provide a more updated expression of intent,
one that is, in addition, focused on the peculiar situation of China. They could and
did provide additional insights into whatWTO negotiators had in mind. Yet, partly
because of how the parties argued the case, the AB did not seek to beneﬁt from
them and instead opted for a more inward looking, judicial approach.
Writing in 2004, Richard Steinberg was not all that worried about the imbalance
between the (automatic) judicial branch and the (consensus-blocked) legislative
branch of the WTO, pointing out correctly that there are multiple, informal ways in
which WTO members (as principals) can steer or inﬂuence Panels and the AB (as
agents).6 Yet, principal–agent literature teaches us that the existence of multiple
6 Richard H. Steinberg (2004), ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and
Political Constraints’, 98:2 American Journal of International Law, 247–275.
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principals affects overall discretion of the agents (or interpretation space in our
case).7 If divergence of interests among principals increases, new autonomy will
open up for judicial agents or, as John Ferejohn put it, ‘Courts and agencies are
capable of independent or autonomous action where the constitutional legislature
is too fragmented to react.’8 This is a crucial insight which may explain the AB’s
restrictive interpretation or, if you wish, activism, in this and some other more
recently decided disputes.9 Whereas at the time of its creation in 1994, the WTO
was controlled by a handful of countries (especially the EU and the US), in more
recent years multiple powerful actors have emerged (including China, Brazil, India,
and South Africa and, most recently, Russia). This interest divergence increases the
AB’s interpretation space, and, in turn, enables the AB to be more activist, knowing
that its rulings may upset some powerful countries but please others. Steinberg
pointed out, in 2004, that ‘WTO dispute settlement could assume a new form as a
result of fundamental changes in the political environment, such as the dispersion
of power at the WTO or a divergence of interests of powerful states. If either shift
were to occur, the strategic space for judicial lawmaking at the WTO would
expand, as it would become more difﬁcult to establish and sustain the political
cooperation necessary to check or correct AB action.’10 The 2011 AB Report on
US–China ADs and CVDsmay well be evidence of a move in exactly this direction.
7Daniel L. Nielson, andMichael J. Tierney (2003), ‘Delegation to International Organizations: Agency
Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform’, 57:2 International Organization, 241–276.
8 John Ferejohn (2002), ‘Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law’, 65:3 Law and Contemporary
Problems, 41–68 at p. 63.
9 See Manfred Elsig and Joost Pauwelyn (forthcoming 2013), ‘The Politics of Treaty Interpretation:
Variations and Explanations Across International Tribunals’, in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack
(eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the
Art, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10 Richard H. Steinberg (2004), ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and
Political Constraints’, 98:2 American Journal of International Law, 247–275, at p. 275.
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